Abstract-
I. INTRODUCTION
With the phenomenal growth of the Internet, it is imperative to test for the security of software during its developmental lifecycle and fix the vulnerabilities, if any is found, before deployment. Until recently, security has been often considered as an afterthought, and the bugs are mostly detected post-deployment through user experiences and attacks reported. The bugs are controlled through patch code (more formally called 'security updates') that is quite often sent to customers via Internet. It is sometimes annoying to notice the icons with tagline 'Security Alerts', 'Updates are ready to be installed on your computer', when someone has just gone through a humongous waiting time for the most recent updates to be downloaded and installed. In addition to causing uncomfortable user experiences, the patch codes developed to fix one bug may often open several new vulnerabilities, which if left unattended, can pose a significant risk for the system (and its associated resources) on which the software is run. We actually illustrate how such potentially critical side effects could sprout from patch codes through one of the case studies presented in this paper. Due to all of the above said reasons, it is critical that software be built-in with security features (starting from the requirement analysis stage itself, and implemented with appropriate modules as well as tested with suitable analysis techniques) during its entire development lifecycle.
In this paper, we focus on testing for software security using source code analysis (also invariably referred to as static code analysis). Static code analysis refers to examining a piece of code without actually executing it [1] . The technique of evaluating software during its execution is referred to as run-time code analysis (also called dynamic code analysis) [2] -the other commonly used approach to test for software security. While dynamic code analysis is mainly used to test for logical errors and stress test the software by running it in an environment with limited resources, static or source code analysis has been the principal means to evaluate the software with respect to functional, semantic and structural issues including, but not limited to, type checking, style checking, program verification, property checking and bug finding [3] . On the top of these issues, the use of static code analysis to analyze the security aspects of software is gaining prominence. Static code analysis helps to identify the potential threats (vulnerabilities) associated with the software, analyze the complexity involved (in terms of increase in code size, development time, and code run time, etc) and the impact on user experiences in fixing these vulnerabilities through appropriate security controls [4] . Static code analysis also facilitates evaluating the risks involved in only mitigating or just leaving these vulnerabilities unattended -thus, leading to an attack, the consequences of such attacks and the cost of developing security controls and integrating them to the software after the attack has occurred [5] . In addition, static code analysis is also used to analyze the impact of the design and the use of underlying platform and technologies on the security of the software [6] . For example, programs developed in C/Unix platforms may have buffer overflow vulnerabilities, which are very critical to be identified and mitigated; whereas, buffer overflow vulnerabilities are not an issue for software developed in Java. Software developed for J2EE platforms are strictly forbidden from using a main function as the starting point of a program, whereas the main function is traditionally considered the starting point of execution of software programs developed in standard J2SE development kits and other high-level programming languages. It would be very time consuming and often ineffective to manually conduct static code analysis on software and analyze the above issues as well as answer pertinent questions related to the security of software. One also needs to have a comprehensive knowledge of possible exploits and their solutions to manually conduct static code analysis. Various automated tools have been recently developed to conduct static code analysis [7] [8] . In this paper, we illustrate the use of a very effective tool developed by Fortify Inc., called the Source Code Analyzer (SCA) [9] . The Fortify SCA can be used to conduct static code analysis on C/C++ or Java code and can be run in Windows, Linux or Mac platforms. The SCA can analyze individual program files or entire projects collectively. The analyzer uses criteria that are embedded into a generic rulepack (a set of rules) to analyze programs developed in a specific platform/ language. Users may use these generic rulepacks that come with the SCA or develop their own customized sets of rules. The SCA has to be first used in command line (Figure 1) to generate a report, in .fpr format (as shown in the first command executed in Figure 1 ), which can be loaded into the Audit Workbench utility (screenshot shown in Figure 2 ), a graphical-user interface utility, included with the Fortify suite of tools. The Workbench interface displays a list of the issues that have been flagged and groups these issues according to their severity (hot, warning, or info). Figure  3 shows a listing of the warning issues identified with the file writer program of the case study presented in Section 2. The Workbench includes an editor that can highlight the troublesome code identified to be the source of a particular vulnerability listed in the Issues panel, and also allows users to make changes to the code within the application. Figure 4 shows a comprehensive picture of the Issues panel with the code editor. One significant use of the Workbench utility is that for each generic issue flagged by the analyzer, the utility provides a description of the problem and how it may be averted. If users think that a security issue raised by the analyzer is of no interest to them (i.e. can be left unattended in the code), then the Workbench utility can be set to suppress the raising of the issue in subsequent instantiations of running the analyzer. At any point of time, the suppressed issues can be unchecked and the issues will be raised if found in the code being analyzed at that time. The Workbench can also generate reports in different formats (like HTML, XML, etc). Note that it is important to make sure the source code that is being analyzed compiles without any error prior to running it with the SCA.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an exhaustive case study involving source code analysis of a log file writer program embedded with features for password management (i.e., validation). This program is used to illustrate six different vulnerabilities and the solutions to remove them. Section 3 presents related work on source code analysis. Section 4 concludes the paper. Note that both the case studies were conducted with the Fortify Source Code Analyzer installed on a Windows XP virtual machine, with Windows 7 as the host operating system and Virtual PC as the desktop hypervisor.
II. CASE STUDY ON A FILE WRITER PROGRAM WITH FEATURES EMBEDDED FOR PASSWORD VALIDATION
In this section, we present a case study on a file writer program through which an authorized user can append an entry to a log file of choice input by the user. The file writer program (originally named as LogFileWriter.java, shown in Figure 5 ) first checks whether the user is authorized to update log files through a password management component that is built-in to the program. Only a user who enters the correct password would be allowed to update the log files. The name of the log file to update is also input (args[0] in Figure 5 ) by the user. The user-entered input for the password (args [1] in Figure 5 ) is compared to the hardcoded password in the program, and if it matches, the user is allowed to open a reference to a PrintWriter class for the log file, and an entry is appended to the file through the reference.
We conduct source code analysis of the log file writer program (shown in Figure 5 ) using the Fortify SCA and the output of the analysis is shown in Figure 1 . Note that the poor logging practice vulnerability (indicated as low category vulnerability) shown in Figure 1 is due to the use of print statements. We do not bother to remove the print statements and so neglect those warnings. The goal of the case study is thus to modify the log file writer program (and still does what it is intended to do) to the extent that the source code analyzer only outputs warnings corresponding to the poor logging practice vulnerability, and all the other vulnerabilities and warnings associated with the program are taken care of (i.e., removed).
A. Hardcoded Password Vulnerability
It is considered a very poor programming practice to hardcode a password. Hardcoding a password (a structural issue) allows all of the project's developers to view the password, and it becomes extremely difficult to fix the problem, once the password is known to the entire team, especially when some of the team members are not authorized to know. Moreover, once the code is in production, the password cannot be changed without patching the software. An attacker, who gets access to the source code or its executable, will easily get access to the hardcoded password (if a user gets access to the executable of the program, he can reverse engineer it and retrieve the source code and the hardcoded password). For example in the case of Java, if an attacker gets access to the .class file of the above log file writer program, he can use the javap -c command to obtain the disassembled code, which will contain the value of the password used. In real world, if the account protected by the password is compromised, the owners of the system will be forced to choose between security and availability.
The solution we propose to fix the above vulnerability is to always store the password for a critical system resource in an encrypted form in a file. To validate a user entered password, one can retrieve the actual (correct) encrypted password from the file and compare it directly with the encrypted version of the user-entered plaintext password (i.e., bit-by-bit comparison of the ciphertext). This is the most secure approach, because the actual password retrieved from the file is stored in main memory (during the execution of the program) only in encrypted format and not in plaintext. Nevertheless, if the encryption algorithm uses a key, then the key has to be securely retrieved (from another file) as well as processed in plaintext to encrypt the user-entered password. Still, a key-based password encryption is preferable, because it adds another layer of complexity for an unauthorized user to access the log file.
B. Empty Password Initialization Vulnerability
Empty passwords (another structural issue) are very vulnerable and can contribute to compromise on system security in a way that is difficult to be remedied. In the log file writer program shown in Figure 5 , we have initialized the String object userEnteredPassword to an empty string and expect it to be appended with the value input by the user. If the user did not pass any String argument as command-line input, then the program does not do anything; it does not print an error message telling that the second command-line argument has to be a String corresponding to the password required to access the log file. This is a good feature from a security point of view -because, only regular users who know how to use the log file writer program should know to pass a command-line input argument corresponding to the password; any non-authorized user who is trying to access the log file writer program should be perplexed at the program not doing anything, including not printing an error message, when he is trying to run it.
Nevertheless, initializing passwords with an empty string, as is done in the log file writer program, is considered to be vulnerable in general, because the control flow of the program could be dynamically altered at run-time, and it is possible for an attacker to exploit the unpredictable execution flow and the empty password initialization to his advantage. Hence, we modify the log file writer program in such a way that the String object userEnteredPassword is defined only inside the 'if' block and is directly assigned the value of command-line input 
C. Denial of Service Vulnerability
A 'Denial of Service' vulnerability (a semantic issue) is the one with which an attacker can cause the program to crash or make it unavailable to legitimate users [11] . Line 16 in the current version of the log file writer ( Figure 9 ) has a Denial of Service vulnerability. We had used the readLine( ) method of the BufferedReader class to read the original correct password from the password text file. We did so because, we know that the password is the only entry in this file and the password could be of any arbitrary length. In order to be able to read passwords of any length (the only requirement is the new line character should not be part of the password), we read a whole line of characters as a String from the text file. However, from a security point of view, this flexibility built-in to the program is a vulnerability and could be exploited by an attacker to cause a Denial of service attack, if he manages to get control of the execution of the file writer program and launch a symbolic link aliasing attack [12] by exploiting a potential time gap that could exist between the time of creating the reference to the FileReader class and actually reading contents from the file. Through this attack, the attacker could read an unbounded amount of input using the readLine( ) method as there is no limit on the number of characters that may be buffered and read as a line. An attacker can take advantage of this code to cause an OutOfMemoryException or to consume a large amount of memory so that the program spends more time performing garbage collection or runs out of memory during some subsequent operation.
The solution we suggest is to impose an upper bound on the number of characters that can be read from the file and buffered at a time (i.e., in one single read operation). In this context, we suggest to use the read( ) method of the BufferedReader class that takes three arguments: a character array to which the characters read from the buffer are stored, the starting index in the character array to begin storing characters and the number of characters to be read from the buffer stream. If the password length is more than the number of characters read to the array, it implies that the complete password has not been read, and such a password cannot be even used to successfully validate an authorized user. However, this is a tradeoff for avoiding the Denial of Service attack. Even when an attacker manages to insert several thousands of characters in a line, the read( ) method will read only at most the number of characters passed as the third argument to the method. In Figure 11 , depicting the modified code to remove the Denial of Service vulnerability, one can notice that we use a buffer length of 20. If the length of the correct password stored in the text file is more than 20 characters, the program displays an error message about the difficulty in being able to read the password in full and terminates; otherwise, the read operation is considered to be successfully executed, and we construct the correctPassword String object using the contents of the character array read from the password text file. Note that the length 20 we used here is arbitrary, and could be even set to 100. The bottom line is there should be a definite upper bound on the number of characters that can be read into the character buffer, and one should not be allowed to read an arbitrary number of characters with no defined upper limit. Figure 12 shows the vulnerabilities and issues that are leftover in the LogFileWriter_3.java file after those identified in Sections 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 are fixed.
D. System Information Leak Vulnerability
The "System Information Leak" vulnerability (a semantic issue) refers to revealing critical system data, program structure including call stack or debugging information that may help an adversary to learn about the software and the system, and form a plan of attack [13] . In our LogFileWriter_3.java program, we observe that in line 58 (as indicated by the SCA in Audit Workbench Issues panel to the left in Figure 12 and also shown in Figure 13 ), the printStackTrace( ) method called on the object of the class IOException has the vulnerability to leak out sensitive system and program information including its structure and the call stack. While revealing the information about the call stack leading to an exception may be useful for programmers to debug the program and quickly as well as effectively trace out the cause of an error, the printStackTrace( ) method needs to be removed from the final program prior to deployment.
A simple fix to this vulnerability is not to reveal much information about the error, and simply state that an error has occurred. The attacker, if he was contemplating to leverage the error information to plan for an attack, would not be able to gain much information from the error message. In this context, we remove the call to the printStackTrace( ) method from line 58 and consider that the error message printed above it in line 57 itself would be sufficient. The modified version of the log file writer program is named LogFileWriter_4.java. An audit (Figure 14) of the Source Code Analyzer on LogFileWriter_4.java no longer shows the presence of the system information leak vulnerability. 
E. Unreleased Resource Vulnerability
The "Unreleased Resource" vulnerability (a control flow issue) occurs if the program has been coded in such a way that it can potentially fail to release a system resource [12] . In our log file writer program, the vulnerability arose due to the use of the FileReader and BufferedReader stream classes to read the password text file (to extract the correct password) as shown in Section 2.1. Even though we have called close( ) methods on the objects 'fr' and 'br' of the above two stream classes immediately after reading the contents of the password text file, it may be possible that due to abrupt termination of the program the two close( ) method calls are not executed (also listed in the Issues panel of Figure 14) . One possible reason for the program control to skip the execution of the two close( ) method calls could be a file read error, which could happen if the password text file is not in the location from which the program is trying to open and read the file. Another reason (which is very unlikely to happen though, given the smaller size of the file) could be that there is no sufficient memory in the system to load the contents of the password text file and read them. Either way, if any such file read error occurs, the program control immediately shifts from the try block to the catch block and the two streams 'fr' of FileReader and 'br' of BufferedReader will never be released until the operating system explicitly forces the release of these resources upon the termination of the program. From a security standpoint, if an attacker could sense the presence of Unreleased Resource vulnerability in a program, he can intentionally trigger resource leaks and failures in the operating environment of the program (like making the file unavailable to be read) to cause a depletion of the resource pool.
The solution we suggest is to add a finally { … } block after the try {…} catch {…} blocks and release all the resources that were used by the code in the corresponding try block. Note that in order to do so, the variables associated with the resources have to be declared outside and before the try block so that they can be accessed inside the finally block. In our case, we have to declare the FileReader object 'fr' and the BufferedReader object 'br' outside the try block and close them explicitly in the finally block. The modified code segment (LogFileWriter_5.java) is shown in Figure 15 . The results generated from analyzing the LogFileWriter_5.java code with the Source Code Analyzer are shown in Figure 16 . Note that as shown in Figure 15 , the reason why we are insisting on including the close( ) method calls on the two stream objects in a finally block instead of a catch block, even though it is supposed to catch the IOException, is that in case a try block can generate multiple exceptions -there has to be multiple catch blocks for the try block, one for each exception, and these catch blocks have to be listed in the order of increasing scope -i.e., the exception that is the bottommost in the hierarchy of exceptions has to be caught first, followed by exceptions further up in the hierarchy. However, if at run-time, an exception higher up in the hierarchy is generated, the control transfers to the catch block of that particular exception, and only the subsequent catch blocks are executed, and not the catch blocks prior to it. This way, if we had included the close( ) methods in the catch block for the IOException class and relied on it to be called in case of a file read error, there might be a situation that another catch block downstream is called due to the generation of an exception higher up in the exception hierarchy, and the two stream objects would not be released. Thus, in any situation, we do not recommend releasing system resources inside catch blocks.
In the same vein, we also argue that it is not advisable to include a finalize( ) method for the particular classes of the objects for which the resources allocated need to be reclaimed. In order for an object's finalize( ) method to be invoked, the garbage collector must first of all determine if the object is eligible for garbage collection. However, the garbage collector is not required to run unless the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) is low on memory, and hence there is no guarantee that an object's finalize( ) method will be invoked in an expedient fashion. Even if the garbage collector gets to run, all the resources will be reclaimed in a short period of time, and this can lead to "bursty" performance and a reduction in the overall system throughput. Such an effect is more pronounced as the load on the system increases. Also, it is possible for the thread executing the finalize( ) method to hang if the resource reclamation operation requires communication over a network or a database connection to complete the operation.
F. Path Manipulation Vulnerability
As can be seen in Figure 16 , the Path Manipulation vulnerability (a dataflow issue) is the only main vulnerability that needs yet to be removed from the log file writer program. In this section, we illustrate our solution to remove this vulnerability, and alongside also incorporate appropriate changes to the code so that the leftover debug code warning listed in the Issues panel of Figure 16 no longer appears. Path Manipulation vulnerability occurs when user input is directly embedded to the program statements thereby allowing the user to directly control paths employed in file system operations [11] . Such a vulnerability may enable an attacker to access or modify otherwise protected system resources. In our log file writer program, the name of the log file that the user wishes to append to is input as a commandline input argument (args[0]) and we directly insert this as the parameter for the File constructor in line 15 (refer Figure 15) . The practice of directly embedding a file name or a path for the file name in the program to access the system resources could be cleverly exploited by a malicious user who may pass an unexpected value for the argument and the consequences of executing the program, especially if it runs with elevated privileges, with that argument may turn out to be fatal. Thus, Path Manipulation vulnerability is a very serious issue and should be definitely not left unattended in a code.
We envision the following solutions to avoid Path Manipulation: (i) Provide a list of valid values the user can enter for the arguments/ variables in question and the user cannot choose anything beyond those values. For example, in the log file writer program, we could present the user the list of files that could be written to and the user has to select one among them. (ii) Use a White list of allowable characters in the user input for the argument/ variable in question. For example, if a user is allowed to write only to a text file, the last four characters of the user input should be ".txt" and nothing else. (iii) Use a Black list of characters that are not allowed in the user input for the argument/ variable in question. For example, if the user is not permitted to write to a file that is in a directory other than the one in which the log file writer program is running, then the input should not have any '/' character to indicate a path for the file to be written to. In this paper, we have implemented solutions (ii) and (iii) through the sanitize( ) method, the code for which is illustrated in Figure 17 .
Note that in the final complete code for the log file writer program shown in Figure 18 , we have eliminated the use of command-line input arguments by obtaining user inputs using the Scanner class. This way, the J2EE Leftover debug code warning issue raised by the Source Code Analyzer is also fixed, as well as user inputs are more interactively obtained. A screenshot of the issues raised by the Source Code Analyzer is shown in Figure  19 , and as one can see, all of the issues raised only correspond to Poor Logging Practice, a warning related to the inclusion of print statements.
Thus, we have completely fixed (i.e., removed) all the vulnerabilities associated with the log file writer program with minimal impact on the functionality of the program. The tradeoffs are: (i) the maximum possible length of the password stored in the password text file is to be known a priori and incorporated to the code; this is to remove the denial of service vulnerability, and (ii) The error messages are not too detailed and a legitimate user entering wrong input information will have to spend some time to figure out what went wrong with his inputs; this is to remove the system information leak vulnerability.
III. RELATED WORK ON SOURCE CODE ANALYSIS
Experimental and exploratory techniques such as automated source code analysis for software verification have begun to be considered at least complementary to the rigorous formal techniques. For example, in [14] , the authors demonstrated the use of automated source code analysis to prove that device drivers of approximately 10,000 lines of code can be free from pointer violations. In certain instances, source code analysis has also become the primary means of understanding the processes (including their behavior) behind software developed for biological, social, economic and governmental systems [15] . Dimensionality reduction is also considered as a viable technique to analyze large code bases and comprehend large software programs. In [16] , the authors segment large software program code into individual methods, treat each method as a document in the context of natural language processing, and use statistical models for concept and feature location (such as LDA-Latent Dirichlet Allocation [17] ) to extract related subsets of program code. This could also facilitate understanding of source code segments that look unfamiliar at first. As part of this, the authors in [16] use the notion of a latent set of topics threaded through a set of documents and develop a LDA-based heuristic that targets at minimizing the number of latent topics required to give a quick and reasonable estimate on whether or not a pair of methods are conceptually related to each other.
One widely adopted technique to reduce the incidence of software vulnerabilities during development lifecycle is to require the programmers to conform their code to secure coding standards. The CERT team at the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon University [18] has taken a pioneering lead in developing secure coding standards for various commonly used high-level programming languages such as C [19] , C++ [20] and Java [21] . They have also developed a Source Code Analysis Laboratory (SCALe) [22] to which developers can upload their code and SCALe provides a conformity assessment of the uploaded software to CERT secure coding standards. One feature that is lacking in these books/literature published on secure coding standards is examples of comprehensive case studies of simple applications (that are developed by students in their undergraduate/graduate curricula) embedded with vulnerabilities; an appropriate discussion on the use of source code analysis for identifying these vulnerabilities; the generic solutions to be incorporated to remove one or more of these vulnerabilities and the resulting impact on the program. We observe the discussion in these books to be more piece-meal, and are focused on only explaining about the vulnerability and how to avoid the specific vulnerability. Through this paper, we propose the use of simple, yet comprehensive, case studies of applications subjected to automated source code analysis and development of generic solution strategies that can be incorporated in any related programming language environment. This way, the generic solution strategies that are proposed in this paper can complement the CERT books/literature that is available on secure coding standards.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Software security is a rapidly growing field and is most sought after in both industry and academics. With the development of automated tools such as Fortify Source Code Analyzer, it becomes more tenable for a software developer to fix, in-house, the vulnerabilities associated with the software prior to its release and reduce the number of patches that need to be applied to the software after its release. In this paper, we have discussed the use of an automated tool called the Source Code Analyzer (SCA), developed by Fortify, Inc., and illustrated the use of its command line and graphical user interface (Audit Workbench) options to present and analyze the vulnerabilities identified in a software program. The SCA could be used in a variety of platforms and several object-oriented programming languages. We present two case studies (a file writer program and connection-oriented server program) of software programs developed in Java that look fine at the outset; but are analyzed to contain critical vulnerabilities, which could have serious impacts when exploited.
The six different vulnerabilities we have studied in this research are: Hardcoded Password vulnerability, Empty Password Initialization vulnerability, Denial of Service vulnerability, System Information Leak vulnerability, Unreleased Resource vulnerability in the context of streams and Path Manipulation vulnerability. We discussed the reasons these vulnerabilities appeared in the code and how they could be exploited if left unattended and the consequences of an attack. We have provided detailed solutions to efficiently and effectively remove each of these vulnerabilities, presented the appropriate code snippets and the results of source code analysis when the vulnerabilities are fixed one after the other. We have also illustrated how new vulnerabilities arise when an existing vulnerability is fixed through the incidence of the Denial of Service and Unreleased Resource vulnerabilities due to the solution incorporated to remove the Hardcoded Password vulnerability. The tradeoffs incurred due to the incorporation of appropriate solutions to fix these vulnerabilities are the increase in code size and decrease in the comfort level for a naïve authentic user who could face some initial technical difficulties in getting the program to run as desired. With generic error messages that are not so detailed, an authentic (but relatively unfamiliar) user ends up spending more time to run the system as desired.
As part of future work, we plan to conduct exhaustive source code analysis on C/C++ programs developed for Windows and Linux platforms, and analyze their impacts and develop effective solutions to fix (i.e., completely remove or mitigate the effects as much as possible) the characteristic vulnerabilities identified for the specific platform/ programming language. Even though the code snippets provided as solutions to remove the various software security vulnerabilities discussed in this paper are written in Java, the solutions proposed and implemented here for each of the vulnerabilities are more generic and can be appropriately modified and applied in other programming language environments.
